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Abstract
This paper explores the discipline effect of short selling on managerial empire building.
Employing short-selling data from 2002-2011, we document a negative association be-
tween the stock lending supply and the subsequent abnormal capital investment. We
also find a positive association between the lending supply and the mergers and acqui-
sitions announcement returns of acquiring firms. Firms with higher lending supplies
also have higher Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. In addition, the discipline effect
is stronger for firms with higher managers’ wealth-performance sensitivity and with
lower financial constraints, and for stock-financing acquisition deals. Alleviating the
endogeneity concern, our multivariate difference-in-difference analysis shows that the
lending supply is a more effective discipline force for firms that are in the Regulation
SHO-Pilot Program during 2005 to 2007.
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1 Introduction
“It is quite clear that one way for a company to steer a course through the jungle
is to be well-run and soundly governed. Then the speculators are more likely to leave
you alone. Short sellers look for weakness and when they find it, they act.”
(Peter Montagnon, chairman of the International Corporate Governance Network, 2008)
Since U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced short selling bans during the 2008
financial crisis, the perennial debate on the role of short sellers has been brought back. On the one
hand, regulators contend that short sellers could harm financial markets by driving stock prices
below their fundamental values and dampen the investor confidence.1 On the other hand, a large
body of literature has shown that short sellers are informed traders, and their trading activities
help to incorporate information into stock prices. For instance, short sellers can identify not only
low future stock returns (e.g., Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang
(2008); Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012)), but also adverse financial reporting, such as
negative earnings (Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004)), financial misrepresentation (Karpoff and
Lou (2010)). Besides, Jensen (2005) argues that“...Short sellers are an obvious source of potentially
valuable information for the governance system...” However, little research has been conducted on
this potential governance effect of short sellers. Our paper fills the void of literature by investigating
whether short sellers have discipline effect on managerial empire building, one of the most value-
1In the order enacting the short-selling restrictions in 2008, SEC states that “...is in the public interest and for the
protection of investors to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets. This emergency action should prevent
short selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even where there is no fundamental basis for
a price decline...”. Meanwhile, two academic studies advocate similar points of view. Goldstein and Guembel (2008)
hypothesize that short sellers might manipulate stock prices, which results in bad managerial investment decision.
Henry and Koski (2010) show that the levels of pre-issue short selling volume are positively related to abnormal
returns on the SEO announcement date, suggesting that short sellers engage in manipulative trading.
destroying agency problems.2
The intuition that the short selling can serve as an external corporate governance mechanism
is as follows. Short sellers have been shown to be able to identify managerial misbehaviors and
unfavorable information that have not been reflected in stock prices, e.g., Bris, Goetzmann, and
Zhu (2007) and Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007). The downward price pressure due to short selling
would damage managers’ personal interests via reduced stock-based compensation and increased
likelihood of a hostile takeover, which might result in the subsequent job loss. Hence, the presence
of an active short selling market could serve as an external governance mechanism on managerial
behavior and deter managers from engaging in value-destroying activities ex ante. Empirically, we
examine the discipline effect of short selling on firms’ abnormal capital investments and mergers
and acquisitions announcement returns of acquiring firms in the subsequent year.
The effectiveness of aforementioned discipline mechanism hinges on the number of shares avail-
able to the short sellers. Short sellers would have less incentive to search for weakness of firms if
they cannot easily borrow shares to short. We use the lending supply in the short selling market
to capture the amount of ammunition that the short sellers can use to profit from spotting the
managerial value-destroying over-investments.3 The higher the lending supply, the more severe the
punishment managers face through the short-selling-induced price pressure once their misconducts
get caught. Relying on this measure, we are able to test our main hypothesis that short selling has
a discipline effect on managerial empire building.
To support our hypothesis, we conduct three sets of tests. First, we examine whether the
discipline force of short selling affects the frequency of large investments. Whited (2006) proposes a
2Richardson (2006) suggests that entrenched managers have a greater tendency to build up empire.
3We use the value of shares supplied for lending, reported by Markit, scaled by firm’s market capital as the measure
for lending supply, same as Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) and Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2012).
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hazard model to measure the magnitude of empire building by focusing on the frequency of invest-
ment spikes (large investments) and the time between spikes (spells). She argues that the hazard
model could address concerns of measurement errors in instruments for investment opportunities
and lumpy characteristics of corporate investments.4 Using the lending supply data from 2002 to
2011, we find that a firm with higher lending supply has less empire building behavior, exhibited
by a lower hazard rate and a longer spell between investment spikes. In particular, we find that a
one-standard-deviation increase in lending supply leads to 20.47% decrease in the hazard rate.
Second, we investigate the discipline effect of lending supply on abnormal capital investments,
the difference between the current capital investment and the average capital investment in the
previous three years, a measure for empire building in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004). Controlling for a
set of firm-specific variables including institutional ownership ratio, E-Index, firm size, sales growth,
leverage and influences from the effects of year and firm, we find that firms with higher lending
supply have lower subsequent abnormal capital investment. A one-standard-deviation increase in
lending supply results in 63.35% lower abnormal capital investment in the following year. This set
of evidence indicates that lending supply in the short selling market would deter managers from
making abnormal capital investments.
Our third set of analysis focuses on mergers and acquisitions, which is a much larger and
easier observable form of corporate investments. Literature has shown that managers may conduct
value-destroying acquisition to expand the size and scope of the firms rather than return cash to
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007); Chen, Harford, and Lin
(2012)). We examine a sample of around 1,000 completed U.S. domestic mergers and acquisitions
4Employing the hazard model method, Billett, Garfinkel, and Jiang (2011) find that firms with more antitakeover
provisions will experience shorter spell lengths between large investments, suggesting that managers at firms with less
shareholder governance will engage in over-investment more frequently. Besides, Chang, Lin, and Ma (2012) find that
firms with more intensive institutional trading have smaller hazard rate of over-investment, indicating the discipline
effect of institutional trading on managerial empire building.
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between 2003 and 2012 and find that acquirers with higher lending supply in the previous year
yield higher announcement returns. After controlling for total assets, past stock returns, return on
asset, Tobin’s Q, fixed asset, R&D, Non-cash working capital, leverage, free cash flow, relative deal
size, dummy of friendly deals, dummy of high-tech deals, dummy of tender offers, dummy of cash
deals, and institutional ownership ratio, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in lending
supply leads to 8.13% standard deviation increase in five-day cumulative abnormal returns. The
results suggest that managers in firms with high lending supply have less tendency to conduct value-
destroying acquisitions. Collectively, these three sets of results are consistent with our hypothesis
that short selling has a discipline effect on managerial empire building.
Next, we investigate whether the discipline force of short selling has effect on the firm value.
We hypothesize that lending supply is positively associated with firm value in the subsequent year as
the value-destroying empire building is disciplined. Relying on a sample of about 20,000 firm-year
observations, we find that firms with higher lending supply have higher Tobin’s Q in the subsequent
year. A one-standard-deviation increase in lending supply results in an increase of 3.89% standard
deviation in the subsequent firm value.
To further substantiate our argument, we first examine the effect of managers’ compensation
on the association between the lending supply and the subsequent managerial empire building.
Specifically, we use the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (ScaledWPS), proposed by Edmans,
Gabaix, and Landier (2009), to measure the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to stock price.
Because it is the threat of downward price pressure due to short selling that deters managers
from empire building, the effectiveness of the discipline mechanism depends on the sensitivity of
managers’ wealth to stock price. Indeed, we find that the negative association between the lending
supply and the hazard rate is more prominent for firms with higher ScaledWPS. We also find that the
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associations between lending supply and the subsequent abnormal capital investment and Tobin’s
Q are more evident in firms with higher ScaledWPS. For the acquisition announcement returns, the
discipline effect is only significant for firms with high ScaledWPS. This set of results strengthens the
interpretation that the negative association between lending supply and overinvestment is rooted
in the discipline force on managerial behavior.
In addition, we use the HP index, proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), to gauge the extent
to which financial constraint levels influence the discipline effect of lending supply. It is intuitive
that managers in financially constrained firms are less likely and able to build up empire for their
private benefits (Whited (2006); Billett et al. (2011)). If the lending supply has discipline effect on
empire building behavior, it should be more significant for firms with less financial constraints. The
results do show that the discipline effect on hazard rate of investment spikes and abnormal capital
investment is stronger for firms with lower HP index (less financially constrained firms).
Moreover, we find that the effect on acquisition announcement returns is only significant in
non-all-cash-financed acquisitions.5 This is consistent with the notion that managers tend to build
up empires in stock-financed deals (Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013)), in which the discipline effect of
lending supply on managerial behavior would manifest. The results also indicate that the positive
association between lending supply and the subsequent Tobin’s Q is more pronounced for firms with
high ScaledWPS and low HP index, which is in line with our hypothesis.
Even though the previous cross-sectional analyses on managerial compensation and financial
constraints help to pin down the mechanism of the discipline effect, the endogeneity issue can still
be a concern. One may argue that lenders in the short selling market, i.e., ETFs or index funds,
might also have information regarding the future managerial behaviors. They may increase lending
5The all-cash-financed deal means the method of payment is 100% cash according to SDC database.
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supply when the manager is expected to have good performance, and vice versa. If this is the case,
the negative relation between lending supply and abnormal capital investment and the positive
relation between lending supply and firms value might reflect the information held by the supply
side (lenders) in the shorting market rather than governance role of short seller (the demand side of
the lending market). Although it is less likely that ETFs and index funds, typical passive investors,
would actively collect firm specific information, we conduct two sets of tests to address this issue.
First, we employ a regulation change in U.S. equity markets, i.e., the Regulation SHO. The price
restriction of short selling (the uptick rules) for a set of randomly selected firms is lifted from
January 2005 to August 2007. We adopt the multivariate difference-in-difference methodology in
this quasi-natural experiment setup and find that the lending supply has stronger discipline effect
for firms that are exempted from the uptick rules. This result provides coherent evidence that short
selling takes role in corporate governance, and its discipline force is more effective when short selling
is less restricted.
Second, we use the residual term from the lending supply regressing on firm size, book-to-
market ratio, firm age, institutional ownership ratio, and turnover ratio as the main independent
variable.6 We re-estimate all our major regression models using the residual lending supply and
show that our main results still hold. These results suggest that our main findings are not driven by
the effects stemmed from institutional investors or other firm characteristics, and further support
that lending supply is a proxy for the governance mechanism from short sellers.
Our paper contributes to two burgeoning strands of literature. First, our study differentiates
and complements two contemporaneous studies of Massa et al. (2012) and Fang, Huang, and Karpoff
(2013) in providing evidence on the discipline effect of short selling. Massa et al. (2012) find a
6Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) show lending supply is closely related to firm size, book-to-market ratio, and turnover
ratio.
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negative relationship between lending supply and earnings manipulation over the period of 2002 to
2009 across 33 countries. Fang et al. (2013) find that discretionary accruals decrease for the treated
firms in the Regulation SHO-pilot program. While both papers study the discipline effect of short
selling on the accrual-based earnings management, we focus on the managerial empire building,
i.e., inefficient corporate over-investment. The reason that our paper focuses on managerial empire
building is because we believe that the empire building destroys firm values more directly than
financial reporting distortion. In addition, our empirical evidence suggests that the discipline effect
of short selling pertains more to the overinvestment than to the “quiet life” hypothesis (Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003)). This might be because it is easier for short sellers to spot and target
managers in firms exhibiting propensity for empire building than enjoying the quiet life. Second,
our paper is also related to and expands the literature on the real effect of financial market (Bond,
Edmans, and Goldstein (2011); Chen et al. (2012); Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012); Hau and
Lai (2012)). We provide evidence that the lending market condition could impact managerial real
resources allocation decisions.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 presents literature review.
Sections 3 includes the description of the data and sample. Section 4 shows the measures and
empirical results. Section 5 includes the additional tests. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 The Role of Short Sellers
Prior literature on the role of short sellers suggests that the informational efficiency of stock prices
is improved when short sellers are more active.7 In Dimond and Verrecchia’s (1987) model, the
7See, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Bris et al. (2007), Chang et al. (2007), Boehmer et al. (2008),
and Boehmer and Wu (2012).
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presence of short sellers speeds up the incorporation of private information into stock prices. By
analyzing 46 equity markets around the world, Bris et al. (2007) provide evidence that short sales
restrictions hinder the quick and accurate reflection of value-relevant information in the stock mar-
ket. Focusing on one market, Hong Kong, Chang et al. (2007) identify the events when stocks
are added to designated short-sale list, and show that short-sales constraints are likely to result in
overvaluation. By using daily short selling data of NYSE-listed firms, Boehmer et al. (2008) show
that heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted ones, suggesting that short sellers play a
role in improving pricing efficiency. Boehmer and Wu (2012) complement Boehmer et al. (2008)
by examining the association between daily short sales and four specific measures of information
efficiency. They provide supportive evidence that the presence of short sellers helps price efficiency.
Prior literature has also shown that short sellers could anticipate managerial misconducts.
Christophe et al. (2004) find that the daily short sales in the five-day prior to earnings announce-
ment are negatively correlated with post-earnings-announcement stock returns, suggesting that
short sellers could predict a negative earnings surprise and a lower stock returns. Desai, Krishna-
murthy, and Venkataraman (2006) find that the difference in short interests between restatement
firms and control firms increases significantly from 18 months before the announcement, and then
started to shrink at one month after the announcement, indicating that short sellers could identify
suspicious financial reports in advance of public release. Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that the
short interests accumulate gradually from 19 months in advance of the public revelation of the
financial misrepresentation, indicating that short sellers could detect both the occurrence and the
characteristic of the managerial misconducts.
These studies focus on how short sellers could improve price efficiency and discover managerial
misbehaviors. Based on these works, we go one step further and ask whether informed and vigilant
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short sellers could server as a discipline force. Specifically, we add to this stream of literature by
testing whether managers will be less likely to engage in empire building when more shares can be
borrowed by short sellers, as managers would be afraid of the reduction in personal welfare brought
by severe short-sales if their misbehaviors get detected.
2.2 Empire Building
Jensen (1986) argues that “...Managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the
optimal size. Growth increases managers’ power by increasing the resources under their control.”
To gauge the empire building based on the frequency of large investments, Whited (2006) develops an
empirical methodology based on hazard model estimation. Hazard model mitigates the potential
measurement errors in the usual proxy for investment opportunities, such as Tobin’s Q. Whited
shows that more financially constrained firms tend to experience longer inactive “spells” between
larger investments (“spikes”), suggesting a lower hazard rate of large investment. Based on the
Whited’s (2006) methodology, Billett et al. (2011) examine the effect of antitakeover provisions,
“G-Index” of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), on managers’ tendency to over-invest. They find
that the hazard rate of well-governed firms lies below that of poor-governed ones, suggesting that
good governance hinders managers from over-investing.
Additionally, Titman et al. (2004) use the last three-year average capital investments to gauge
the benchmark of firm’s investment rate, and define the abnormal capital investment (CI) as the
difference between the current year’s capital investment and the benchmark. They show that the
negative association between the CI and the consequent abnormal stock return is more prominent
when firms have more free cash flow and lower leverage ratios and when hostile takeovers are less
likely to occur, suggesting that investors tend to underreact to the value-destroying implication for
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an increased CI (empire building).
Existing literature has shown that mergers and acquisitions, much larger and more easily ob-
servable corporate investments, would also be used by managers to extract their own benefits.
Masulis et al. (2007) show that managers at firms with more antitakeover provisions tend to initiate
acquisition deals that hurt shareholders, reflected by a lower abnormal announcement return. It
suggests that antitakeover provisions would shield managers from the discipline effect of the market
of corporate control, and thereby lead to managerial value-destroying empire building. Employ-
ing the natural experiments of the drops in analysts coverage, Chen et al. (2012) document that
managers at firms experiencing exogenous decrease in analyst coverage are more likely to engage in
acquisition deals with lower announcement returns. It suggests that analysts undertake a monitor-
ing role of managerial behaviors and deter managers from conducting value-destroying acquisition
deals.
Our paper contributes to this line of research by examining how lending supply affect both the
capital investment and the announcement stock returns of acquirers. We document a new external
corporate governance mechanism on the the value-destroying managerial empire building.
3 Data
We use equity lending supply from Markit, a research company that provides equity lending
data collected from security lending desks of most large firms in short-selling market. This dataset
includes firm-level information regarding the number of shares available for lending, lending trans-
actions, and weighted average loan fee, and covers from 2002 to 2011. Besides, we obtain stock
price, stock return, and number of shares outstanding from Center for Research in Security Prices.
Relevant accounting data is from COMPUSTAT. Institutional ownership is from Thomson-Reuters
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Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.
In addition, we obtain acquisitions sample from the Securities Data Corporations (SDC) U.S.
Mergers and Acquisitions database. We impose the following restrictions8: (1) The acquisition is
completed; (2) The acquiring firms should have less than 50% of target firms’ shares before the
acquisition, and own more than 50% of target firms’ shares after the acquisition; (3) The deal is
included in our sample if the deal value disclosed in SDC database is more than $1 million and
more than 1% of the market value of acquirer;9 (4) The acquirer firm should have corresponding
financial information in COMPUSTAT; (5) The acquirer should have daily stock return data in
CRSP at least 100 days before the announcement; (6) The acquirer could find matching data in the
lending supply data. The imposition of these restrictions results in a final sample of around 1,000
U.S. domestic mergers and acquisitions from 2003-2012.
4 Measures and Main Empirical Tests
4.1 Lending Supply Measure
Following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) and Massa et al. (2012), we construct lending supply (LS) as
the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm’s market capitalization. Since abnormal
capital investments are calculated annually, we compute the lending supply for firm i in year t based
on the annual average of the value of shares available for lending.10 In Table A-1 , we presents the
determinants of lending supply. Consistent with Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), we also find firms with
higher book-to-market ratio and liquidity tend to have higher lending supplies.11 More importantly,
8The application of these filters is following Masulis et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2012).
9Market value of acquirer is calculated as (total asset − common equity + common shares outstanding × fiscal
year end stock price).
10Markit provides weekly data after 2004 and daily data after 2006, we therefore use the average monthly, weekly
or daily data to estimate the annual average value of shares available for lending. We then scale the value by firm’s
market capitalization.
11Coefficients on market size are positive before we control for the effect from institutional ownership ratio.
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we find that the institutional ownership ratio (IOR) is the most significant determinant of the
number of loanable shares in the equity lending market.12 To show our results are not driven by
the level of IOR, we control for it in all of our main tests.
4.2 Hazard Estimation
In this section, we carry out the hazard model estimation for the empire building. The detailed
procedure is discussed in Appendix A. Following Whited (2006) and Billett et al. (2011), we also
focus on the subsample of small firms. Whited (2006) argues that large firms are more likely to have
different business segments, which could help firms to smooth investment, and thereby reduce the
hazard rate. She thus only keeps small firms to mitigate this issue. We define small firms as firms
whose total asset is below the 33rd percentile of the total assets of all firms in the 1st year that the
firm includes in our sample. Besides, in order to capture whether an investment spike occurs for a
firm in a certain year, we define the investment spike as four different thresholds, namely 2 or 2.5
times the firm’s own median Investment/Assets ratio and 2 or 2.5 times the industry median value
in that year.13 In particular, we perform the hazard model estimation as follows:
λi(t) = ωiλ0(t)exp(LSi,t · γ + xi(t)′ · β) (1)
where xi(t) represents a vector of covariates which identifies observable differences across indi-
vidual firms, and includes two-digit industry dummies, year dummies, ratio of cash flow to assets,
sales growth, the logarithm of total asset and leverage ratio. The firm characteristic variables are
calculated between the current and previous spikes. The discipline effect of short selling predicts
12Most of the suppliers of loanable shares are institutional investors, especially ETF and index mutual funds.
13We impose restrictions that we have more than three observations both in the industry-year and firm-year.
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that the coefficient of LS (γ) should be statistically negative, indicating that high lending supply
would reduce the hazard rate and extend the duration between large investments.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the sample firms included in hazard model estimation.
In Panel A, we summarizes the mean, median, and standard deviation of firm characteristics,
including investment/assets ratio, lending supply, leverage ratio, cash flow, sales growth and the
logarithm of the total assets. The average value of investment/assets is 0.04 with a standard
deviation of 0.07. The mean value of LS is 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.06.14 In Panel B,
we reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of spell characteristics. In particular, this
sample set includes 1,219 spells, and the average spell length between two investment spikes is 3.48
years.
Table 2 presents the results of hazard model estimation. In columns (1) and (2), an investment
spike occurs when the firms’ investment rate in this year exceeds the 2 and 2.5 times median
value of firms’ own investment rate, respectively. In columns (3) and (4), an investment spike
occurs when the firms’ investment rate in this year exceeds the 2 and 2.5 times median value
of industry’s investment rate, respectively. We find that the coefficients on LS are negatively
and statistically significant.15 For example, in column (1), we find that a one-standard-deviation
increases in LS results in 20.47% decrease in the hazard rate of large investment. Overall, these
results are supportive for our main hypothesis that lending supply has discipline effect.
14LS measure has a quite low first lag autocorrelation of 11.76%, which suggests that we use LS as a time-varying
convariate is credible.
15The coefficients reported in this table is in the exponential form. Besides, we also include the estimation of
baseline hazard. However, since we focus on the coefficients on the covariate of LS, the results of the baseline hazard
rates are omitted.
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4.3 Abnormal Capital Investment
Following Titman et al. (2004), we first calculate the abnormal capital investment (CIt) in a given
year,
CIt =
CEt
(CEt−1 + CEt−2 + CEt−3)/3
− 1 (2)
where t represents the year when the abnormal capital investment is calculated, and CEt is a firm
capital expenditure (Compustat Data Item 128, CAPEX) scaled by its total asset in year t. We then
investigate the effect of short selling on abnormal capital investment, by performing the following
regression:
CIi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (3)
where ai, at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. CIi,t is calculated according
to Eq.(2). The variable of interest is the coefficient on the LS (a1). Xi,t−1 denotes a set of control
variables, including total asset (TotAsset), the logarithm of book to market ratio (BM), fixed asset
(FixAsset), firm’s age (Age), leverage ratio (Leverage), cash flow (CashFlow), ROA, institutional
investor ownership ratio (IOR), the Entrenchment Index proposed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2009) (E-Index), and Gompers et al. (2003) G-Index. In addition, we cluster the standard error at
the firm level.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for these variables. The mean value of LS is 0.11 with
a standard deviation of 0.14, and the mean value of CI is 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.80.
The estimation results of Eq.(3) are included in Table 4. The coefficients on LS are negatively
significant across all specifications, suggesting that the discipline effect of lending supply on the
subsequent abnormal capital investments is significant and robust. It is noteworthy that the results
remain qualitatively unchanged when we add E-Index and G-Index in the regression, though the
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sample size decreases dramatically. The discipline force from the short sellers is distinct from the
known internal governance mechanism. This effect is economically significant as well. For example,
in specification (10), we find that a one-standard-deviation higher in LS leads to 4.38% standard
deviation decrease in the subsequent abnormal capital investment ((0.14×(−0.25))/0.80 = 4.38%).16
The results of other control variables are also worthy of discussion. The coefficients on BM
are negatively significant, suggesting that firms’ investment level is positively related with firms’
growth opportunities, consistent with Richardson (2006). All of the coefficients on leverage are
negative and significant, suggesting that firms with high debt ratio are less likely to experience
higher abnormal capital investments, consistent with Titman et al. (2004). The coefficients on sales
growth are positive and significant in most specifications, suggesting that managers in firms with
good past performance tend to build up empire (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)). In addition,
the coefficient on G-Index is significantly positive, indicating that firms with poor shareholder gov-
ernance tend to experience higher abnormal capital investment. The E-Index exhibits the expected
sign on the coefficient though insignificant.
Overall, these results are supportive to our main hypothesis, suggesting that lending supply
has a discipline effect on subsequent managerial empire building. This effect remains strong and
significant after controlling for a set of firm-specific variables that have been shown to might affect
corporate investments.
16We will use the same method to compute the economic magnitude of the effect of lending supply throughout the
rest of the paper.
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4.4 Mergers and Acquisitions Returns
In this section, we examine the discipline effect of short selling on managerial acquisition decisions.
In particular, we carry out the following regression model:
CAR(−2, 2)i,t = a0 + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (4)
where LSi,t−1 refers to the measure of lending supply for firm i in year t-1. CAR(−2, 2)i,t refers to
the cumulative abnormal return of merger and acquisition for firm i in year t, and is computed as the
residuals of market model based on 5-day event window (-2,2), where day 0 is the announcement
date.17 We first use the daily stock return in the period of (-210, -11) to estimate the market
model, with CRSP value-weighted return as market return. Then, we use the coefficients derived
from this stage to compute the residuals from the market model during event window (-2,2). Xi,t−1
includes a set of acquirer- and deal-specific control variables. In particular, acquirer-specific variables
consists of the logarithm of total asset (TotAsset), Tobin’s Q, leverage, return on asset, compounded
daily excess returns over previous year (PastStockReturn), free cash Flow, and non-cash working
capital. Deal-specific variables includes the ratio of deal value and the acquirer’s market value of
total assets (RelativeDealSize), high-tech dummy variable (High-tech), tender offer dummy variable
(TenderOffer), friendly deal attitude dummy variable (FriendlyDeal), cash deal dummy variable
(CashDeal).18 We also include 2-digit industry dummies and year dummies and cluster the standard
errors at both firm and year level (Petersen (2009)).
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for M&A sample firms. We find that the average
CAR(-2,2) is 0.20% with standard deviation of 7.41%. The mean value of LS is 0.11 with standard
17The way we compute the cumulative abnormal return is based on Chen et al. (2012).
18We follow Chen et al. (2012) to use these control variable.
16
deviation of 0.12. Table 6 reports the regression results of Eq.(4). Across all specifications, the
coefficients on LS are positive and statistically significant. It suggests that firms with higher LS
experience better market responses for their M&A announcements. In particular, column (14)
suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in LS is associated with a 8.13% standard deviation
increase in CAR(-2,2). This set of results implies that when managers face a higher level of potential
short selling, they are less likely to conduct value-destroying M&As for private benefit. Together
with the findings in the previous two subsections, our first hypothesis is supported: higher lending
supply, i.e., more ammunition for the short sellers, can effectively deter managers from building up
empire.
4.5 Subsequent Firm Value
In this section, we test our second hypothesis that lending supply has a positive impact on firm
value in terms of Tobin’s Q. Our previous results demonstrate that high LS would deter managers
from undertaking value-destroying investments, which would reduce the agency costs otherwise
incurred. We therefore argue that firms with higher LS would experience higher subsequent firm
value. Specifically, we perform the regression as follows:
IndAdj Tobin′sQi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (5)
where ai, at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. LSi,t−1 refers to the measure
of lending supply for firm i in year t-1. Following Gompers et al. (2003), we employ the industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q to measure the firm value. In particular, IndAdj Tobin′sQ refers to the ratio of
market value of assets and the book value of assets, and adjusted for the median of 2-digit industry,
in which market value of assets is defined as the difference between the sum of the book value of
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assets and the market value of common stock and the sum of book value of common stock and
balance sheet-deferred taxes. 19 The set of control variable, Xi,t−1, includes: the logarithm of the
market capitalization (SIZE), the leverage ratio (Leverage), cash flow (CashFlow), the ratio of R&D
and total asset (R&D),20 the ratio of PP&E and sales (Fixed Asset), the ratio of capital expenditure
to the total assets (Capx), the logarithm of cash (Cash), the logarithm of sales (Sale), the firm’s
age (AGE), the return of equity (ROE), the institutional investors ownership ratio (IOR), the ratio
of dividend and book value of equity (Dividend), the ratio of net income to book value of equity
(ROE), and the fraction of shares held by insiders, such as CEO, CFO, COO as well as president,
to the total shares outstanding (InsiderOwn).21 In addition, we also add E-Index and G-Index as
described in Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). These two papers document that
both G-Index and E-Index are related to firm value. Hence, we include these two variables to control
for the potential discipline effect stemmed from antitakeover provisions. In all specifications, we
also cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Table 7 presents the regression results of Eq.(5). The results show a significantly positive
correlation between lending supply (LS) and the subsequent firm value. As for column (12), a
one-standard-deviation increase in LS leads to a 3.89% standard deviation increase in industry ad-
justed Tobin’s Q. Although the sample size decreases radically, the governance effect of LS remains
significant after adding E-Index or G-Index as shown in column (13) and (14). It is also noteworthy
that most of the coefficients on Capx are significantly negative. It suggests a negative relation-
ship between firm’s capital investments and subsequent firm value, consistent with the notion that
overinvestment can destroy firm future value.
Overall, these results suggest that firms with higher lending supply would experience higher
19We also require there are at least 5 firms within a certain industry.
20We set Dividend and R&D as zero when firm does not report the dividend and R&D data in all of our tests.
21The construction of the set of control variables is largely based on Kim and Lu (2011).
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firm value in the following year, which is consistent with our second hypothesis.
5 Additional Supporting Evidence
In this section, we conduct three sets of analyses to attribute the documented negative asso-
ciation between the supply of loanable shares and the subsequent empire building to the discipline
effect of short selling on managerial decisions. We split our sample into subsamples based on the
scaled managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, the firms’ financial constraint levels, and the pay-
ment method for acquisition. Then we re-estimate our basic regressions to further corroborate our
interpretation.
5.1 Wealth Performance Sensitivity
In this subsection, we examine whether the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price would
influence the disciplinary effect of lending supply. The rationale is as follows: if it is the downward
price pressure induced by short selling that deters managers from engaging in empire building, the
efficiency of this mechanism would substantially hinge on the extent to which managers’ wealth is
linked to stock price. We use the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (ScaledWPS), introduced in
Edmans et al. (2009), to measure the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price.22 We expect the
disciplinary effect of short selling to be more pronounced for firms with high ScaledWPS level. To
test this hypothesis, we partition the whole sample into three groups equally based on ScaledWPS
level, and re-estimate our basic regressions in Tables 2, 4, 6, and 7.
The subsample results of the hazard model estimation are presented in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 8. In the high ScaledWPS subsample, the coefficient on LS is -1.48 with t-value of 3.24,
22ScaledWPS represents the dollar change in CEO wealth for a one hundred percentage change in firm value, scaled
by annual flow compensation.
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while the coefficient on LS in the low ScaledWPS subsample is insignificant though with the right
sign. These results suggest that the negatively significant effect of lending supply on hazard rate of
over-investment is largely driven by the subsample with higher ScaledWPS.
Likewise, first three columns of Table 9 show that the effect of lending supply on subsequent
managerial empire building is negatively significant for firms whose managers’ compensation more
closely linked to stock price (top tercile ScaledWPS of the sample). Meanwhile, the effect is in-
significant for firms with lower ScaledWP, indicating that the significant disciplinary effect of short
selling is mainly driven by the firms with higher ScaledWPS.
In addition, we find the negative association between the lending supply and the acquirer
firms’ announcement returns appears to be only significant in the subsample of firms with higher
ScaledWPS. We display the results in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 10. It suggests that when
managers’ wealth is more closely linked to stock price, the discipline mechanism of lending supply
is more effective in terms of deterring managers from conducting value-destroying acquisitions.
Finally, we focus on the analysis of the effect of lending supply on the following firms’ value.
Column (1) of Table 11 displays the results of the whole sample with ScaledWPS data, and columns
(2) and (3) include the results of the sample with ScaledWPS in the top and bottom tercile,
respectively. We find that the coefficient on the LS in the top tercile is 0.55 with 10% significance
level, which is above 3 times of the value of whole sample.23 Meanwhile, the coefficient on the
subsample with ScaledWPS in the bottom tercile is insignificant, providing supportive evidence that
the discipline effect of LS on managerial empire building is more pronounced when firms’ ScaledWPS
is high. It is also noteworthy that the coefficients on insider ownership (InsiderOwn) and the square
of insider ownership (InsiderOwn2) indicate a strong and significant hump relationship between
23A lower significance level in this test might be due to a sufficient decrease in sample size by merging with the
ScaledWPS dataset.
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firm value and insider ownership, which is consistent with Kim and Lu (2011).
Overall, these results confirm our expectation that the governance effect of short selling is
largely driven by the firms with higher sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price.
5.2 Financial Constraint
In this section, we examine how financial constraints affect the disciplinary effect of lending supply.
It is intuitive that managers at non-financially-constrained firms are more likely to engage in empire
building, since they have more resources to exploit. Therefore, we expect the disciplinary effect of
lending supply on managerial empire building would be stronger for these firms that are more
vulnerable to this agency problem. In particular, we employ the HP Index, introduced in Hadlock
and Pierce (2010), to gauge the extent to which the firm is financially constrained.24 We compute
the HP index as follows:
HPi,t = −0.727× Sizei,t − 0.043× Size2i,t − 0.040×Agei,t (6)
where Size equals to the logarithm of the total assets, and Age is the number of years since the first
date of the companys total assets data showed in COMPUSTAT. Following the literature, we winsor
Size at the (log of) $4.5 billion, and winsor Age at thirty-five year. The higher the HP Index is, the
more financially constrained the firm is, as young and small firms are more likely to be financially
constrained.
In the hazard model estimation, we divide our sample into three subsamples based on their
HP index level, and test whether the hazard rate is higher in firms with low HP index. Columns
24Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that firm size and age are useful predictors of the levels of firms’ financial constraint.
Based solely on firm size and age, they propose a measure of financial constraint (HP Index).
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(3) and (4) in Table 8 present the results. For the low HP subsample, the coefficient on LS is -0.75
with t-value of 1.79, while the coefficient on LS in the high HP subsample is insignificant though
with the right sign. This suggests that firms with less financial constraint (low HP group) would be
more likely to experience shorter duration of two investment spikes, an indicator of empire building.
Likewise, in the tests of abnormal capital investment, we divide our sample into three subsam-
ples conditional on the levels HP Index, and re-estimate the specification of column (9) of Table 4.
We display the results in columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 9. Focusing on the result in column
(6), which includes firms with HP Index in the top tercile, the coefficient on LS is -0.31 with 1%
significance level, which is almost two times as much as that in column (4) (whole sample with
HP index data). This confirms our hypothesis that the negative association between the lending
supply and the subsequent abnormal capital investment is largely driven by firms with less financial
constraints.
Moreover, columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 11 present that the coefficient on LS is 0.32 with
1% significance level for the subgroup with HP index in the bottom tercile of sample (less financially
constrained). However, the effect of LS on the subsequent firm value is insignificant for firms with
HP Index in the top tercile of the sample. Overall, these findings provide us additional support for
our hypothesis and reinforce the discipline interpretation of our results.
5.3 Payment method of acquisition
Fu et al. (2013) find that stock prices of stock-financed bidders are more over-valued than those of
cash-financed bidders, and cash-financed deals do not generate average negative cumulative abnor-
mal returns during the announcement period. These results are consistent with the argument in
Jensen (2005) that value-destroying acquisition driven by over-valued stock price might reflect the
22
agency costs associated with stock overvaluation. In this subsection, we therefore divide mergers
and acquisitions sample into two subsamples based on whether the deal is 100% cash-financed. We
expect that the discipline effect of LS plays a less important role when acquirers use all cash method
to pay, as less agency costs are associated with cash-financed acquisition. Columns (4), (5) and (6)
in Table 10 present the results. In column (6), we only include acquisitions using all cash payment
method, and column (5) refers to the rest of the deals that use at least some stocks as payment
method. Indeed, we find that the positive association between LS and CAR(-2,2) only exists in
non-all-cash deals. In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in LS results in an increase of
21.19% standard deviation of 5-day abnormal stock announcement returns of acquirer firms, which
is almost three times as much as that of in column (4) (the whole sample). It suggests that the
discipline effect of lending supply is more prominent in stock-financed acquisitions through which
managers are more likely to take advantage of overvalued stocks to build up empire.
6 Endogeneity Issue
6.1 Pilot Program
In order to tackle the potential endogeneity issue, we employ a regulation change in U.S. equity
market, Regulation SHO (2005-2007), which eliminates the the price restriction of short selling for
a set of randomly selected firms. Regulation SHO is announced by SEC in 2004, which randomly
selects around 1,000 pilot firms and removes their price restrictions (uptick rules) for short selling
from January, 3, 2005 to August 6, 2007.25 We argue that the lift of price restriction for short
selling enhances the governance effect of lending supply on managerial empire building behavior,
since lower short sale constraint poses a greater threat to the managers. In particular, we perform
25For the details of the program, see also Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009).
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the following regression models:
CIi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 × LSi,t−1 × Treated× Pilot+ a3 × LSi,t−1 × Treated+
a4 × LSi,t−1 × Pilot+ a5 × Treated× Pilot+ a6 × Pilot+ a7 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t
(7)
(IndAdj Tobin′sQ)i,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 × LSi,t−1 × Treated× Pilot+
a3 × LSi,t−1 × Treated+ a4 × LSi,t−1 × Pilot+ a5 × Treated× Pilot+ a6 × Pilot+
a7 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t
(8)
where ai, at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. CIi,t is calculated according to
Eq.(2), and IndAdj Tobin′sQi,t is computed according to the procedure in Section 4.5. Treated is
a dummy variable indicating firms that are selected as Reg SHO pilot stock. Pilot is a time dummy
which equals one from 2005 to 2007, otherwise zero. Xi,t−1 denotes a set of control variables, which
is same to the Section 4.3 and Section 4.5. In this test, our sample is from 2002 till the end of the
PILOT program (2007). In addition, we cluster the standard error at the firm level. As we control
for the firm fixed effect, the coefficient on the Treated dummy is omitted.
Our main variable of interest is the coefficient on the three-way interaction, a2. Table 12 shows
that a2 is negatively significant in columns (1) and (2), and positively significant in columns (3) and
(4), suggesting that the lift of price restriction for short selling enhances the disciplinary effect of
LS on the subsequent empire building and then increase firm values. This set of the results assures
us that our previous findings are not driven by potential endogeneity or omitted variable issues.
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6.2 Residual of Lending Supply
Besides the quasi-natural experiment of PILOT program, we also use the residual LS to validate
our arguments. In particular, we estimate the residual term of LS regressing on firm size, book-to-
market ratio, firm age, institutional ownership ratio, and turnover ratio with controlling for firm
and year fixed effects.26 Since our measure of residual LS is by construction orthogonal to these
firm characteristics, we argue that our previous findings do not merely reflect the effects of the firm
characteristics that are known to be associated with investments and firm values.
We re-estimate our major regression models by using residual LS, and we present the results
in Table 13. In column (1), we find that the negative relation between LS and the subsequent CI
still holds when we use the residual LS measure. In column (2), we find that the coefficient on the
residual LS is 0.049 at 5% significance level, suggesting the discipline effect of lending supply on the
managerial value-destroying mergers and acquisitions are robust to using residual LS. In column
(3), we find a positive and significant relation between residual LS and the subsequent firm value.
Overall, these results suggest that our main findings are robust and supportive to our hypothesis
that lending supply has discipline effect on managerial empire building.
26Literature has shown that institutional ownership and equity returns is related, we therefore add IOR to ensure
that our results are not driven by the effects from institutional investors (Gompers and Metrick (2001); Yan and
Zhang (2009)).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the disciplinary effect of lending supply in the short selling market
on deterring managers from empire building. Employing the lending supply data from 2002 to 2011,
we find that firms with more lending supply will have low hazard rate and long spells between two
adjacent investment spikes. We also find that firms with more lending supply are less likely to
experience abnormal capital investment in the subsequent year. Besides, we document a positive
association between the lending supply and the mergers and acquisitions announcement returns of
acquiring firms, suggesting that a higher level of lending supply would also deter managers from
conducting value-destroying acquisitions. In addition, we document a positive relation between
lending supply and subsequent firm value. The firm value improves because the effective threat of
short selling discourages managers from value-destroying empire building.
Importantly, we find that the discipline effect is more prominent for firms with high managers’
wealth-performance sensitivity (ScaledWPS) but insignificant for firms with low ScaledWPS. As
the effectiveness of the lending supply largely hinges on the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock
price, this result helps to attribute our findings to the discipline effect of short selling on managerial
misbehavior. In addition, we also find the discipline effect is stronger for firms with less financial
constraints and for stock-financed M&A deals. These results indicate that managers tend to build
up empires in less financially constrained firms and in stock-financed acquisition deals, in which
the discipline effect of lending supply on managerial behavior would manifest. We also find that
the association between lending supply and subsequent firm value is stronger for firms with high
ScaledWPS and less financial constraints.
To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, we employ the Regulation SHO, which eliminates the
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price restriction of short selling for a set of randomly selected firms. The multivariate difference-
in-difference results indicate that the lending supply has stronger discipline effect for firms that are
exempted from the short selling price restriction. This result provides coherent evidence that short
selling takes role in corporate governance, and its discipline force is more effective when short selling
is less restricted. Finally we employ the residual LS regressing on firm size, book-to-market ratio,
firm age, institutional ownership ratio, and turnover ratio, as an alternative measure of short selling
discipline force, and find our main results still hold. It indicates that our main findings are robust
to controlling for those firm characteristics and supportive to our hypothesis that lending supply
has discipline effect on managerial empire building.
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Appendix A: Hazard Model Estimation for Empire Building
This appendix describes the methodology for estimating the hazard model of empire building. We adopt and follow
the approach of Whited (2006). Specifically, following Meyer (1990), Whited (2006) uses nonparametric specification,
including unobservable heterogeneity and time-varying explanatory variable, and defines the proportional hazard form
as:
λi(t) = ωiλ0(t)exp(xi(t)
′β) (A.1)
A hazard model contains two parts. The first part, denoted as λ0(t), is the baseline hazard function, which is a
function of time duration. The second part is exp(xi(t)
′β), which represents a function of explanatory variables. xi(t)
represents a vector of covariates which identifies observable differences across individual firms. β is the vector of
coefficients of those covariates, which allows the hazard rates moves upward or downward according to different value
of covariates. t represents the length of a spell, the duration between two investment spikes. ωi is a random variable
and represents the unobservable heterogeneity, it is assumed to follow Gamma distribution and with unit mean and
variance, σ2.27
Maximum likelihood method is employed to estimate the coefficients. Denote Ti as the actual length of time
between investment spikes and the censoring time as Ci for firm i. Define δi = 1 if Ti ≤ Ci and 0 otherwise. Let
hi = min(Ti, Ci). The Log-likelihood function is as follows:
L(γ, β) =
N∑
i=1
ln{[1 + σ2
hi−1∑
t=0
exp(xi(t)
′β + γ(t))]−1/σ
2 − δi[1 + σ2
hi∑
t=0
exp(xi(t)
′β + γ(t))]−(1/σ
2) (A.2)
where
γ(t) = ln(
∫ t+1
t
λ0(s)ds) (A.3)
and σ represents the variance of the gamma distribution. The estimation method would select the shape of the hazard
to maximize the likelihood of observed durations in the sample.
27The hazard model method also allows for right-censoring of data. For example, if a firm experience an investment
spike in 2003, and the firm’s data ended in 2006, then the length of the firm’s final spell would be censored to three
years.
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Lending Supply (LS) The ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization
CI Following Titman, Wei and Xie (2004), we construct the measure of abnormal capital in-
vestment as the ratio of CPAX/Total Asset.
IndAdj Tobin′sQ The ratio of market value of assets and the book value of assets, and adjusted for the median
of 2-digit industry, in which market value of assets is defined as the difference between the
sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock and the sum of book
value of common stock and balance sheet-deferred taxes.
IOR The ratio of the institutional investors ownership to the total shares outstanding.
TotAsset The logarithm of total assets. (item 6 from COMPUSTAT)
Leverage The ratio of the long term debt (dltt+dls) to the total assets.
ROA The ratio of net income to the total assets.
Tobin’s Q The ratio of market value of assets and the book value of assets. (Market value of assets is
defined as the difference between the sum of the book value of assets and the market value
of common stock and the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet-deferred
taxes.)
BM The logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
SaleGrowth Changes in sales scaled by lagged sales.
CashFlow The sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by
total assets.
R&D The ratio of R&D and the total assets.
FixedAsset The ratio of PP&E to the sales.
Dividend The ratio of the dividend to the book value of equity.
Sale The logarithm of the sales.
AGE The first date of the company total assets data in COMPUSTAT (in logarithm).
Capx The ratio of capital expenditure to the total assets.
Cash The logarithm of the cash.
HP Index Computed based on the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
ScaledWPS Following Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we employ scaled wealth-performance sen-
sitivity to capture the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to the stock price. It is the dollar
change in the CEOs wealth for a 100 percentage point change in the stock price, scaled by
annual pay.
E index The Entrenchment index of Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009).
G Index The governance index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003).
Insider Ownership The fraction of shares held by insiders (CEO, CFO, COO, President) to the total shares
outstanding.
PastStockReturns Compounded daily stock returns over previous year of the merger and acquisition (log).
High-tech A dummy variable equals to one when both acquirer and target are from the high-tech
industries (from SDC), zero otherwise.
RelativeDealSize The ratio of the deal value (from SDC) and the firm’s market value of total assets.
TenderOffer A dummy variable equals to one when the deal involves a tender offer, zero otherwise.
FriendlyDeal A dummy variable equals to one when the deal attitude is friendly, zero otherwise.
FreeCashFlow The difference between operating income before depreciation and the summation of the
interest expense, income taxes, and capital expenditure, scaled by total asset.
NonCashWorking The difference between the current assets and the summation of the current liabilities and
cash and cash equivalents, scaled by total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total
assets.
CashDeal A dummy variable equals to one when the pay method is 100% cash.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Analysis for hazard model
This table reports the descriptive statistics for sample firms in hazard model test. Investment/Asset is
the calculated as (data30-data107)/data6. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and
depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. SaleGrowth is the growth rate of sales. TotAsset is
the logarithm of data6. Lending Supply (LS) is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending
and firm’s market capitalization. Leverage is the (data9+data34)/data6. A firm is included if its real assets
are below the 33rd percentile of the real assets of the firms in the first year that the firm appears in the our
sample. Avg. spell length measures the average number of years that the firm’s investment rate does not go
beyond the pre-defined investment threshold. We employ 2 times of the firm’s median investment rate as the
investment trigger. Fraction censored refers to the percentage of right censored spells in the sample. Length
censored (uncensored) refers to the number of censored (uncensored) years that a firm remains inactive.
N Mean Median Std. Dev
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Investment/Asset 4319 0.0388 0.0200 0.0666
LS 4506 0.0602 0.0415 0.0624
Leverage 4505 0.1045 0.0542 0.1284
CashFlow 4507 -0.0472 0.0422 0.2626
SalesGrowth 4498 0.2764 0.1214 0.7070
TotAsset 4507 3.7855 3.8964 1.0073
Panel B: Spell Characteristics
Avg. spell length 1219 3.4807 3.0000 2.2210
Fraction censored 1219 0.5193 0 0
Length censored 633 4.6951 4.0000 2.1781
Length uncensored 586 2.6177 2.0000 1.8297
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Table 2. Semi-parametric hazard model estimates: effects of Lending Supply (LS)
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization, which
covers from 2002 to 2011. Following Whited (2006) and Billet et al. (2011), we include firms whose real assets
are below the 33rd percentile of the real assets in the first year that the firm appears in sample. CashFlow
is the sum of net income and depreciation divided by total assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales.
A spike is defined as an investment rate exceeds a threshold, and the thresholds are pre-defined as 2 and 2.5
times the firm median investment rate (or firms’ industry’s median contemporaneous investment rate). The
number of year since the last spike has also been included, though coefficients are omitted. t-values are in
parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Firm Industry
(1) 2 times (2) 2.5 times (3) 2 times (4) 2.5 times
LS -0.6855 -0.7959 -0.2290 -0.2006
(7.93)*** (7.18)*** (4.28)*** (4.45)***
Leverage -1.5821 -1.7582 0.4493 0.1618
(3.69)*** (3.45)*** (1.28) (0.52)
SalesGrowth 0.1802 0.1558 0.0526 0.0344
(3.34)*** (3.70)*** (1.05) (0.71)
CashFlow -0.2329 -0.2247 1.2772 1.0472
(1.25) (1.08) (5.90)*** (5.74)***
TotAsset 0.0022 -0.1037 0.0174 0.0383
(0.04) (1.57) (0.34) (0.84)
obs 4495 4498 4498 4494
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
log likelihood -1575.49 -1240.28 -2104.28 -1782.66
31
Table 3. Summary Statistics: Analysis for abnormal capital investments and firms value
Lending Supply (LS) is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization.
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and
depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. SalesGrowth refers to the changes in sales scaled by lagged sales.
TotAsset is the logarithm of total asset. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. Firm value is calculated
as the Tobin’s Q, the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to the
book value of total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Age is derived from the first date of the
companies total assets data in Compustat (logarithm). Capx is the ratio of capital expenditure to the total assets.
IOR is the ratio of the institutional ownership to the total shares outstanding. IndAdj Tobin′sQ is referred to the
ratio of market value of assets and the book value of assets, and adjusted for the median of 2-digit industry, in which
market value of assets is defined as the difference between the sum of the book value of assets and the market value
of common stock and the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet-deferred taxes. Sale is logarithm of
the sale. Dividend is the ratio of dividend and book value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income to book value of
equity. R&D is the ratio of R&D and total asset. FixedAsset is the ratio of PP&E and total sales. Following Edmans
et al. (2009), we employ scaled wealth-performance sensitivity to capture the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to
the stock price (ScaledWPS). This measure is the dollar change in the CEOs wealth for a 100 percentage point change
in the stock price, scaled by annual pay. InsiderOwn is equal to the fraction of shares held by insiders, such as CEO,
CFO, CO as well as president, to the total shares outstanding. E Index is the Entrenchment index of Bebchuk et
al. (2009). G Index is the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003). The detailed definitions of these variables are
reported in Appendix B.
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev
CI 24291 0.0565 -0.1010 0.7997
LS 24930 0.1110 0.0648 0.1420
IOR 24995 0.5768 0.6255 0.3016
TotalAsset 24995 6.2558 6.1942 2.0235
BM 24925 -0.7856 -0.7089 0.8617
CashFlow 24959 0.0239 0.0722 0.2149
Tobin’s Q 24991 1.9447 1.4990 1.3299
ROA 24995 -0.0166 0.0360 0.2184
SalesGrowth 24702 0.1560 0.0839 0.4473
Leverage 24888 0.1863 0.1428 0.1904
HP Index 23496 -7.1846 -6.7695 2.9006
ScaledWPS (in thousands) 11581 0.0280 0.0065 0.0856
MktSize 23208 6.2987 6.2717 1.9311
IndAdj Tobin′sQ 23867 -0.3858 -0.4563 1.3419
Sale 23682 6.0795 6.1532 2.1099
AGE 23825 2.6486 2.6391 0.8769
DIV 23657 0.0227 0.0000 0.0564
R&D 23686 0.0043 0.0000 0.0284
PPE 23672 0.8672 0.3750 1.5271
CAPX 23835 0.0479 0.0299 0.0559
Cash 23868 0.3734 0.0596 1.1243
InsideOwnership 23862 0.0629 0.0178 0.1106
ROE 23870 0.0376 0.0880 0.3955
E Index 7565 2.4726 3.0000 1.2505
G Index 7678 9.0619 9.0000 2.6278
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Table 4. Lending Supply and the Subsequent Abnormal Capital Investment
This table reports the regression results for Eq.(3). The dependent variable is abnormal capital investment (Titman
et al. (2004)). LS is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization,
which covers from 2002 to 2011. IOR is the ratio of the institutional ownership to the total shares outstanding.
TotAsset is the logarithm of total asset. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. CashFlow is the sum of
income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. ROA is the ratio of
net income to total assets. SaleGrowth is the changes in sales scaled by lagged sales. Leverage is the ratio of long
term debt to total assets. E Index is the Entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). G Index is the governance
index of Gompers et al. (2003). All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates
are suppressed. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses.
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsequent Abnormal Capital Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LS -0.2130 -0.2608 -0.3004 -0.1670 -0.1550 -0.1710 -0.1729 -0.1796 -0.1320 -0.2521 -0.2147
(3.52)*** (4.31)*** (4.94)*** (2.60)*** (2.41)** (2.66)*** (2.68)*** (2.77)*** (2.02)** (2.50)** (2.30)**
IOR 0.2211 0.3597 0.3225 0.2750 0.2855 0.2915 0.3167 0.2686 0.3139 0.2115
(3.04)*** (4.78)*** (4.31)*** (3.69)*** (3.83)*** (3.91)*** (4.32)*** (3.65)*** (2.36)** (1.69)*
TotAsset -0.1600 -0.1556 -0.1153 -0.1019 -0.1116 -0.1325 -0.1031 -0.2205 -0.2353
(5.84)*** (5.64)*** (4.22)*** (3.65)*** (3.94)*** (4.86)*** (3.76)*** (5.31)*** (5.73)***
BM -0.0947 -0.1155 -0.1045 -0.1009 -0.0909 -0.1050 -0.1468 -0.1390
(5.68)*** (6.63)*** (6.01)*** (5.80)*** (5.25)*** (6.03)*** (5.43)*** (5.09)***
CashFlow -0.3756 -0.3829 -1.1153 -1.0973 -1.0201 -0.4408 -0.1186
(4.57)*** (4.66)*** (4.09)*** (4.03)*** (3.82)*** (1.15) (0.26)
Tobin’s Q 0.0285 0.0278 0.0288 0.0226 0.0173 0.0143
(2.30)** (2.24)** (2.32)** (1.82)* (0.96) (0.76)
ROA 0.7213 0.7241 0.5338 0.1345 -0.2662
(2.79)*** (2.81)*** (2.11)** (0.40) (0.62)
SaleGrowth 0.0783 0.0775 0.1563 0.1664
(3.17)*** (3.15)*** (3.56)*** (3.62)***
Leverage -0.6532 -0.4789 -0.6274
(6.67)*** (3.21)*** (4.08)***
E Index 0.0137
(0.53)
G Index 0.0204
(1.20)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. 24273 24273 24273 24269 24251 24250 24250 24019 23916 7375 7494
R2 0.2476 0.2482 0.2512 0.2538 0.2564 0.2569 0.2575 0.2542 0.2584 0.3576 0.3311
33
Table 5. Summary Statistics: Analysis for the mergers and acquisitions
The sample consists of domestic mergers and acquisition from 2003-2012. CAR(-2,2) is the cumulative abnor-
mal return calculated using a market model estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement
date (day 0). Lending Supply (LS) is the measure of the value of shares that are available for rent, scaled
by firm’s market capitalization. TotAsset is logarithm of the item 6 in COMPUSTAT. Compounded daily
stock returns over previous year of the merger and acquisition (log). ROA is the ratio of net income to total
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to
the book value of total assets. FixedAsset is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) and sales.
R&D is the ratio of R&D and the total asset. RelativeDealSize is the ratio of the deal value (from SDC) and
the firm’s market value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. FreeCashFlow
is the difference between operating income before depreciation and the summation of the interest expense,
income taxes, and capital expenditure, scaled by total asset. The detailed definitions of these variables are
reported in Appendix B.
N Mean Median Std. Dev
CAR(-2,2) 1018 0.0020 0.0031 0.0741
LS 1018 0.1106 0.0714 0.1222
TotAsset 1018 6.8782 6.8251 1.8304
PastStockReturn 1017 0.0905 0.1307 0.4496
ROA 1018 0.0368 0.0533 0.1616
Tobin’s Q 1018 -1.1029 -0.7570 1.3634
FixedAsset 1018 0.2286 0.1460 0.2197
R&D 1018 0.0416 0.0038 0.0738
NonCashWorking 974 0.2331 0.2102 0.2122
Leverage 1013 0.1902 0.1566 0.1780
FreeCashFlow 1018 0.0294 0.0390 0.1222
RelativeDealSize 1018 0.1772 0.0843 0.2389
FriendlyDeal 1018 0.9882 1.0000 0.1080
High-tech 1018 0.4273 0.0000 0.4949
TenderOffer 1018 0.0766 0.0000 0.2661
CashDeal 1018 0.4008 0.0000 0.4903
IOR 1018 0.6553 0.7321 0.2773
ScaledWPS 541 61.5683 6.6914 642.0740
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Table 8. Semi-parametric hazard model estimates: the effects of ScaledWPS and HP Index
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization, which
covers from 2002 to 2011. Following Whited (2006) and Billet et al. (2011), we include firms whose real assets
are below the 33rd percentile of the real assets in the first year that the firm appears in sample. Following
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), ScaledWPS is the measure of scaled wealth performance sensitivity,
the dollar change in wealth for a one-percentage-point change in firm value, divided by annual pay. We
construct HP index, by using the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). A firm is defined
as a high (low) ScaledWPS firm if its average ScaledWPS is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the
average ScaledWPS. A firm is defined as a high (low) HP Index firm if its average HP Index is above (below)
the 67th (33rd) percentile of the average HP Index. Cash flow is the sum of net income and depreciation
divided by total assets. Sales growth is the growth rate of sales. A spike is defined as an investment rate
exceeds a threshold, and the threshold is pre-defined in terms of 2 times the firm median investment rate.
The number of year since the last spike has also been included, though coefficients are omitted. t-values are
in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Hazard Estimation
ScaledWPS HP Index
(1) High (2) Low (3) High (4) Low
LS -1.4811 -0.7517 -0.1273 -0.7477
(3.24)*** (1.08) (0.33) (1.79)*
Leverage -3.1972 -5.2735 0.2169 -5.0601
(1.19) (0.57) (0.10) (0.65)
SalesGrowth 3.0355 0.6021 0.0198 0.5154
(1.,98)** (0.18) (0.17) (0.55)
CashFlow -0.0354 0.4593 -0.5360 -0.4198
(0.03) (0.11) (0.58) (0.30)
TotAsset -1.5784 -0.3675 -0.1465 -0.0597
(2.95)*** (0.32) (0.37) (0.15)
Obs. 532 462 1551 1088
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
log likelihood -300.78 -178.85 -516.79 -375.65
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Table 9. Lending Supply (LS) on Subsequent Abnormal Capital Investments: the effects of ScaledWPS and HP
Index
The dependent variable is abnormal capital investment (CI). Lending Supply (LS) is the ratio of the value of shares
available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization. HP index is calculated based on the methodology
described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Following Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we employ scaled wealth-
performance sensitivity to capture the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to the stock price (ScaledWPS). This
measure is the dollar change in the CEOs wealth for a 100 percentage point change in the stock price, scaled by annual
pay. HP index is computed based on the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). A firm is defined as
a high (low) ScaledWPS firm if its ScaledWPS is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the ScaledWPS of the
sample. A firm is defined as a high (low) HP Index firm if its HP Index is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of
the HP Index of the sample. Abnormal Capital Investments is defined following Titman et. al. (2004). TotAsset is
the logarithm of total asset. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt
to total assets. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled
by total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects,
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level.
t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsequent Abnormal Capital Investment
ScaledWPS HP Index
(1) All Samples (2) High (3) Low (4) All Samples (5) High (6)Low
LS -0.2255 -0.4448 -0.2347 -0.1728 -0.2189 -0.3102
(2.78)*** (2.06)** (1.50) (2.43)** (0.99) (3.34)***
IOR 0.1625 0.4709 0.1393 0.3038 0.4145 0.3069
(1.72)* (1.89)* (0.70) (4.04)*** (2.03)** (2.57)**
TotAsset -0.1368 -0.1709 -0.1533 -0.1135 -0.0929 -0.1559
(5.31)*** (3.10)*** (2.29)** (3.72)*** (1.18) (4.14)***
BM 0.0623 0.0745 0.1069 -0.0301 -0.0551 0.0468
(3.24)*** (1.75)* (2.61)*** (1.53) (1.31) (2.22)**
CashFlow -0.4581 -0.3733 -0.8554 -0.9534 -0.9937 0.1637
(1.21) (0.39) (1.28) (4.08)*** (3.09)*** (0.34)
Tobin’s Q 0.0715 0.0696 0.1271 0.0230 0.0039 0.0741
(4.49)*** (2.36)** (2.71)*** (1.47) (0.16) (3.23)***
ROA 0.7643 0.9000 0.9518 0.5097 0.4181 0.1361
(2.13)** (0.98) (1.52) (2.39)** (1.38) (0.30)
SaleGrowth 0.2388 0.3410 0.1608 0.0870 0.0721 0.1366
(6.70)*** (4.29)*** (2.21)** (3.56)*** (2.25)** (3.49)***
Leverage -0.4705 -0.3831 -0.5489 -0.6011 -0.5681 -0.2919
(4.59)*** (1.81)* (1.86)* (5.84)*** (2.51)** (2.27)**
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 11316 3720 3648 22569 7264 7565
R2 0.2743 0.4021 0.4241 0.2684 0.2919 0.3628
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Table 10. Lending Supply (LS) and the Subsequent Mergers and Acquisition abnormal returns of acquirer firms: the
effects of ScaledWPS and Payment method
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization, which covers
from 2002 to 2011. CAR(-2,2) is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model estimated over
the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day 0). Lending Supply (LS) is the ratio of the value
of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization . TotalAsset is logarithm of the item 6
in COMPUSTAT. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. CashFlow is the sum of income before
extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. Firm value is calculated as the Tobin’s
Q, the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to the book value of total
assets. NonCashWorking is the difference between the current assets and the summation of the current liabilities and
cash and cash equivalents, scaled by total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. PastStockReturns is
the compounded daily stock returns over previous year of the merger and acquisition. FreeCashFlow is the difference
between operating income before depreciation and the summation of the interest expense, income taxes, and capital
expenditure, scaled by total asset. FixedAsset is the ratio of PP&E and sales. High-tech is a dummy variable equals
to one when both acquirer and target are from the high-tech industries (from SDC), zero otherwise. FriendDeal is
a dummy which equals to one if the attitude is friend (SDC), zero otherwise. CashDeal is a dummy variable which
equals to one if the deal is all cash financed, otherwise zero. A firm is defined as a high (low) ScaledWPS firm if its
ScaledWPS is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the ScaledWPS of the sample. All Cash Deal represents
those deals that use 100% cash for payment as reported in SDC. Non All Cash Deal refers to the complement sample.
Year dummies and two digit industry dummies are also used to control for industry effects, while their coefficients
are omitted. Following Petersen (2009), standards errors are adjusted for two-way cluster adjusted for firm and year.
t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
CAR(-2,2)
ScaledWPS Cash Deal
(1) All Samples (2) Low (3) High (4) All Samples (5) NonAllCashDeal (6)AllCashDeal
LS 0.0525 0.2299 0.1123 0.0473 0.1285 -0.0676
(2.48)** (1.80)* (0.97) (1.91)* (3.31)*** (1.52)
TotAsset -0.0066 -0.0037 -0.0066 -0.0050 -0.0066 -0.0053
(2.57)** (0.64) (1.52) (4.72)*** (3.43)*** (2.58)**
PastStockReturn 0.0372 0.0779 0.0574 0.0192 0.0266 0.0120
(2.67)*** (2.58)** (1.70)* (2.67)*** (2.79)*** (0.63)
ROA -0.0028 0.0917 -0.0298 -0.0266 -0.0192 -0.0589
(0.10) (1.00) (0.45) (1.03) (0.68) (1.82)*
Tobin’s Q -0.0001 0.0104 0.0170 -0.0009 0.0020 -0.0014
(0.03) (1.86)* (1.52) (0.59) (0.63) (0.26)
FixedAsset 0.0710 0.0998 0.0853 0.0561 0.0645 0.0240
(2.21)** (1.28) (1.21) (2.34)** (2.38)** (0.65)
R&D -0.1307 -0.0310 -0.0596 -0.1100 -0.0938 -0.0772
(2.32)** (0.32) (0.47) (2.35)** (1.30) (0.73)
NonCashWorking -0.0038 -0.0017 -0.0484 0.0054 0.0071 -0.0021
(0.10) (0.03) (0.65) (0.34) (0.33) (0.07)
Leverage -0.0074 -0.0949 -0.0542 -0.0032 -0.0167 -0.0033
(0.35) (1.69)* (1.12) (0.19) (0.65) (0.16)
FreeCashFlow -0.0539 -0.0123 -0.1224 0.0363 0.0149 0.1864
(0.71) (0.05) (1.09) (0.67) (0.25) (1.75)*
RelativeDealSize -0.0472 -0.0664 -0.0522 -0.0115 -0.0211 0.0398
(2.46)** (1.09) (3.04)*** (0.73) (1.25) (1.05)
FriendlyDeal -0.0195 0.0294 0.0941 0.0133 -0.0049 0.0061
(1.06) (0.55) (3.90)*** (0.69) (0.16) (0.49)
High-tech 0.0066 -0.0012 -0.0231 0.0044 0.0134 0.0033
(0.54) (0.05) (0.96) (0.54) (1.46) (0.33)
TenderOffer 0.0062 0.0089 0.0080 -0.0001 -0.0127 -0.0032
(0.73) (0.61) (0.34) (0.01) (0.45) (0.37)
CashDeal 0.0078 0.0020 0.0011
(1.01) (0.12) (0.08)
IOR 0.0061 -0.0185 -0.0173 0.0054 -0.0111 0.0372
(0.37) (0.47) (0.33) (0.54) (0.97) (1.99)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 541 178 179 968 582 386
R2 0.2305 0.4181 0.3783 0.1096 0.1459 0.2367
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Table 11. Lending Supply (LS) and the Subsequent Firm Value: the effects of ScaledWPS and HP Index
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization, which covers from 2002 to
2011. Firm value is referred to the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q, the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus
market value of equity to the book value of total assets and adjusted for the median of 2-digit industry. HP index is calculated
based on the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Following Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we employ
scaled wealth-performance sensitivity to capture the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to the stock price (ScaledWPS). This
measure is the dollar change in the CEOs wealth for a 100 percentage point change in the stock price, scaled by annual pay. A
firm is defined as a high (low) ScaledWPS firm if its ScaledWPS is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the ScaledWPS
of the sample. A firm is defined as a high (low) HP Index firm if its HP Index is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the
HP Index of the sample. Size is the logarithm of market capitalization. Sale is logarithm of the sale. IOR is the ratio of the
institutional ownership. Age is derived from the first date of the companys total assets data in Compustat. Leverage is the ratio
of long term debt to total assets. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization,
scaled by total assets. Dividend is the ratio of dividend and book value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income to book
value of equity. R&D is ratio of R&D and total asset. FixedAsset is the ratio of PP&E and sales. Capx is the ratio of capital
expenditure to the total assets. Insider ownership is equal to the fraction of shares held by insiders, such as CEO, CFO, CO as
well as president, to the total shares outstanding. All regressions are controlled for year and firm fixed effects, while coefficients
are omitted. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsequent Firm Values
ScaledWPS HP Index
(1) All Samples (2) High (3) Low (4) All Samples (5) High (6)Low
LS 0.1736 0.5536 0.0306 0.2194 0.1377 0.3209
(2.10)** (1.71)* (0.30) (2.81)*** (0.54) (3.51)***
IOR -0.0075 -0.1897 0.0291 -0.1601 -0.6545 0.0923
(0.05) (0.54) (0.12) (1.51) (2.48)** (0.70)
Size 0.0638 0.1132 -0.0034 -0.0450 -0.1706 0.0561
(2.31)** (1.55) (0.08) (2.11)** (4.02)*** (1.87)*
Sale -0.3906 -0.5444 -0.2205 -0.2565 -0.1799 -0.3058
(6.32)*** (4.00)*** (2.08)** (5.27)*** (2.16)** (3.90)***
Leverage -0.4492 -0.3897 -0.1022 -0.4699 -0.5136 -0.4995
(3.01)*** (1.07) (0.47) (3.87)*** (1.70)* (2.81)***
CashFlow 0.3286 2.1454 -0.3032 -0.2276 -0.3692 0.0526
(1.24) (3.57)*** (0.81) (1.66)* (1.86)* (0.28)
Age -0.2063 -0.1179 -0.1096 -0.3331 -0.5065 -0.0481
(1.76)* (0.39) (0.58) (4.28)*** (2.67)*** (0.47)
Dividend -0.3177 0.3488 -0.3077 0.0395 0.5020 -0.0301
(1.35) (0.75) (0.95) (0.14) (0.64) (0.07)
R&D 315.5276 682.7516 198.8703 -0.0378 -0.9361 -0.1998
(1.80)* (2.46)** (1.05) (0.03) (0.71) (1.32)
FixedAsset -0.1606 -0.1616 -0.0812 -0.0569 -0.0072 -0.0976
(3.23)*** (1.31) (1.08) (2.08)** (0.16) (2.75)***
Capx 0.0489 -0.0701 -0.4131 -0.0111 -0.8690 -0.4510
(0.16) (0.12) (0.59) (0.03) (1.36) (1.18)
Cash -0.0326 -0.0768 0.0064 -0.0711 -3.3677 -0.0638
(2.56)** (2.73)*** (0.66) (3.04)*** (1.91)* (3.09)***
InsiderOwn 0.6594 0.2001 0.2453 0.4768 0.3441 -0.0041
(2.05)** (0.31) (0.51) (1.53) (0.61) (0.01)
InsiderOwn*2 -0.2598 0.5387 -0.0844 -0.4155 -0.1405 0.4646
(0.95) (0.66) (0.25) (0.67) (0.13) (0.31)
ROE 0.1425 -0.2701 0.2207 0.0713 0.0639 0.0739
(1.59) (1.50) (1.61) (1.30) (0.72) (1.07)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10423 3429 3400 22671 7216 7665
R2 0.7499 0.8186 0.7874 0.7172 0.7463 0.7201
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Table 12. The impact of SHO on the governance effect of Lending Supply (LS) on CI and Tobin’s Q
This table presents the impact of the changes in short-selling regulation on the governance effect of lending supply (LS) on CI
and Tobin’s Q. Regulation SHO is announced by SEC in 2004. SEC randomly selects a sample of pilot securities and formally
removes their price restrictions for short selling on January, 3, 2005. We employ Eq.(7) and Eq.(8), and this table includes
the results. The sample is from 2002 till the end of the PILOT program (2007). SHO is a dummy variable which equals to
one if the firm is selected as a Reg SHO pilot security during year 2004 to 2007, zero otherwise. LS is the ratio of the value
of shares available supplied for lending and firm’s market capitalization . Size is the logarithm of total asset. CashFlow is the
sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. BM is the logarithm of the
book-to-market ratio. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets.
SaleGrowth is the changes in sales scaled by lagged sales. Sale is logarithm of the sale. IOR is the ratio of the institutional
ownership. Age is derived from the first date of the companys total assets data in Compustat. Leverage is the ratio of long
term debt to total assets. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled
by total assets. Dividend is the ratio of dividend and book value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income to book value of
equity. R&D is ratio of R&D and total asset. FixedAsset is the ratio of PP&E and sale. Capx is ratio of capital expenditure
and total assets. InsiderOwn is equal to the fraction of shares held by insiders, such as CEO, CFO, CO as well as president. All
regressions are controlled for year and firm fixed effects, while coefficients are omitted. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are clustered at the firm and year level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsequent CI Subsequent Firm Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS -5.8421 -4.8707 1.6960 1.9052
(3.86)** (4.50)*** (2.40)** (2.31)**
LS×Treated× Pilot -3.7144 -3.9323 2.3353 2.0104
(2.59)*** (2.73)*** (2.02)** (2.06)**
LS×Treated 3.8782 4.0099 -2.0832 -1.9665
(3.32)*** (3.11)*** (1.88)* (2.33)**
LS×Pilot 5.6028 4.8134 -1.6380 -1.2632
(3.75)*** (4.59)*** (1.89)* (1.98)**
Treated×Pilot 0.0656 0.0843 -0.1241 -0.1164
(1.41) (2.22)** (1.41) (1.18)
Pilot 0.1592 0.1390 -0.0115 0.0333
(3.24)*** (2.87)*** (0.26) (0.29)
IOR 0.2849 0.2838 -1.0975 -0.6555
(2.72)*** (2.53)** (7.32)*** (5.14)***
Size -0.2248 0.0868
(1.00) (0.97)
Leverage -1.2660 -0.0493
(6.17)*** (0.70)
ROA -0.1924
(9.15)***
Tobin’s Q 0.5740
(2.80)***
BM 0.0146
(0.28)
SaleGrowth 0.0277
(3.42)***
CashFlow -0.2894
(0.91)
R&D 0.0633
(1.75)*
FixedAsset -0.0002
(3.97)***
Dividend -0.1757
(1.32)
Sale -0.3471
(7.63)***
Age -0.4473
(4.64)***
Capx -1.0798
(1.76)*
Cash -0.0159
(1.88)*
InsiderOwn 0.4705
(3.72)***
InsiderOwn2 -0.0631
(4.03)***
ROE 0.0226
(0.27)
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummy Y Y Y Y
No. 13178 13035 14625 14245
R2 0.3664 0.3791 0.7335 0.748441
Table 13. Results of Residual LS
This table presents the results using residual LS to re-test our major regression models. Residual LS is estimated by regress LS
on contemporaneous firm size, book-to-market ratio, firm age, and institutional ownership ratio with firm and year fixed effect
included. In column (1), the dependent variable is abnormal capital investment in the subsequent year. In column (2), the
dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for acquirer firms. In column (3), the dependent variable is
the subsequent Tobin’s Q in the following year. In columns (1) and (3), we control for both year and firm fixed effect. In column
(2), we control for both industry and year fixed effect. The detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B.
We cluster standard errors at the firm and year level in column (2), and cluster standard errors at the firm level at columns (1)
and (3). t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsequent CI CAR (-2,2) Subsequent Firm Value
Abnormal LS -0.1344 0.0489 0.2295
(2.05)** (2.00)** (2.95)***
IOR 0.2428 0.0136 -0.1497
(3.34)*** (1.61) (1.42)
Size -0.1002 -0.0055 -0.0368
(3.67)*** (5.98)*** (1.76)*
Leverage -0.6532 -0.0050 -0.4708
(6.67)*** (0.30) (3.87)***
ROA 0.5340 -0.0270
(2.11)** (1.02)
Tobin’s Q 0.0227
(1.82)*
BM -0.1111
(6.69)***
SaleGrowth 0.0776
(3.16)***
CashFlow -1.0202 -0.2237
(3.82)*** (1.55)
R&D -0.1073 -0.3704
(2.32)** (0.35)
FixedAsset 0.0551 -0.0650
(2.28)** (2.41)**
Dividend 0.0710
(0.26)
Sale -0.2644
(5.45)***
Age -0.3108
(4.04)***
Capx -0.0442
(0.13)
Cash -0.0713
(3.05)***
InsiderOwn 0.4468
(1.43)
InsiderOwn*2 -0.3617
(0.58)
ROE 0.0764
(1.26)
PastStockReturn 0.0192
(2.77)***
FreeCashFlow 0.0338
(0.61)
NonCashWorking 0.0048
(0.31)
RelativeDealSize -0.0083
(0.54)
FriendlyDeal 0.0141
(0.76)
High-tech 0.0053
(0.66)
TenderOffer -0.0025
(0.23)
CashDeal 0.0076
(1.87)*
Year Dummies Y Y Y
Firm Dummies Y N Y
Industry Dummies N Y N
Obs. 23916 966 22578
R2 0.2585 0.1053 0.7185
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Table A-1 . Determinants of Lending Supply (LS)
This table presents the determinants of Lending Supply (LS). LS is the ratio of the value of shares available supplied
for lending and firm’s market capitalization, which covers from 2002 to 2011. Size is the logarithm of firms’ market
capitalization. BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
IOR is the ratio of institutional investors ownership. Age is the first date of the companys total assets data in
COMPUSTAT (logarithm). Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. InsiderOwnership is the fraction
of shares held by insiders (CEO, CFO, CO, President). Idio Vol is the measure of idiosyncratic volatility based on
Fama French three-factor model. Past Return is the compounded daily stock returns over previous year of the merger
and acquisition (log). Illiq is the measure of illiquidity as proposed in Amihud (2002). CashFlow is the sum of income
before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. Dividend is the ratio of dividend
yield and total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D and the total asset. ROE is the return on equity. AnalystsCov
is the number of analysts. AnalystsDisp is the standard deviation of analysts forecasts scaled by the absolute mean
forecasts. Columns (1), (2), and (3 ) use the contemporaneous LS as dependent variable. Models 4, 5, and 6 use the
subsequent LS as dependent variable. Two digit industry dummies are also used to control for industry effects, while
their coefficients are omitted. Constant is also omitted. Following Petersen (2009), standards errors are adjusted for
two-way cluster adjusted for firm and year. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Lending Supply
LSi,t LSi,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIZE -0.0166 -0.0270 -0.0463 -0.0041 -0.0111 -0.0245
(2.18)** (2.29)** (2.02)** (0.96) (1.68)* (2.52)**
BM 0.0019 -0.0071 -0.0154 0.0071 0.0009 -0.0035
(0.62) (1.63) (1.49) (2.34)** (0.17) (0.40)
IOR 0.2298 0.2171 0.1459 0.2370 0.2260 0.1775
(3.61)*** (3.72)*** (3.20)*** (5.81)*** (6.07)*** (4.41)***
Age 0.0096 0.0057 0.0040 0.0086 0.0063 0.0087
(3.63)*** (2.35)** (1.60) (1.91)* (1.79)* (1.45)
Leverage 0.0125 -0.0192 -0.0181 -0.0188 -0.0413 -0.0394
(0.55) (1.82)* (1.49) (2.09)** (3.43)*** (2.29)**
InsiderOwnership 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0207 0.0071 0.0046 -0.0159
(0.11) (0.08) (1.06) (0.97) (0.71) (1.18)
Idio Vol -0.0832 -0.1039 0.2048 0.1500 0.1753 1.5059
(0.35) (0.53) (1.05) (0.77) (0.79) (0.90)
Past Return 0.0010 0.0017 0.0045
(0.38) (0.52) (0.84)
Illiq 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.0046 -0.0055 -0.0023
(0.19) (0.64) (0.74) (3.77)*** (4.13)*** (2.50)**
CashFlow -0.0507 -0.0157 -0.0206 0.0038
(1.95)* (0.49) (1.65)* (0.19)
Dividend 0.0001 0.0003 0.0016 0.0023
(0.12) (0.31) (2.21)** (2.01)**
R&D 0.0000 0.4495 0.0001 0.1312
(0.00) (1.55) (2.14)** (0.37)
PP&E 0.0049 0.0002 0.0068 0.0037
(0.79) (0.04) (2.12)** (0.60)
ROE -0.0000 -0.0171 -0.0001 -0.0060
(0.54) (1.27) (1.81)* (1.41)
Sale 0.0162 0.0246 0.0118 0.0175
(2.28)** (1.92)* (2.44)** (1.85)*
AnalystsCov 0.0016 -0.0002
(2.09)** (0.30)
AnalystsDisp 0.1305 0.3857
(0.91) (5.66)***
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. 18154 18014 7004 18734 18582 7108
R2 0.5210 0.5355 0.6409 0.4596 0.4759 0.5065
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